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Bender: Liability of the Manufacturer

NOTES

LIABILITY OF THE MANUFACTURER TO THE
ULTIMATE CONSUMER
This article is a discussion of manufacturer's liability to the ultimate
consumer' based upon the theories of negligence, strict liability in tort,
and warranty under the uniform Commercial Code.
NEGLIGENCE
Manufacturer's liability in negligence is determined by the general
principles of negligence. 2 The consumer must show that the product
was defective as a result of the manufacturer's negligence and that this
defect caused the injury.3
The standard of care imposed upon the manufacturer is the standard
of care that a reasonably prudent person in the position of the manufacturer would exercise in designing, 4 producing, 5 and warning 6 in order
"to avoid unreasonable risk of harm from use of his products by those
'7
likely to be exposed to the risk."
IUltimate consumer is defined as any person who consumes or uses a product or
obtains the benefit of the product. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS (hereinafter referred to as RESTATAEMENT) §402A comment J.
'Gilliam, Products Liability in a Nutshell, 37 ORE. L. REV. 119, 144 (1957-58). Originally privity was required in order to recover under negligence. Winterbottom v.
Wright, 10 M. & W. 109, 11 L.J. Ex 445 (1842). Three exceptions were developed
to this harsh rule. The first was if the product was inherently dangerous. The
second was if the plaintiff was an invitee and the third was if there was a fraud
or wilful misrepresentation present. See Huset v. The Case Threshing Machine Co.,
120 F. 865, 57 C.C.A. 237, 51 L.R.A. 303 (1903). A further exception was developed
in MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 217 N.Y. 382, 11 N.E. 1050, 1916 F.L.R.A.
696, 1916, C. Ann. Cas. 440 (1916). The requirement of privity was dissolved where
the product if negligently made was certain to place life in danger. This last
exception became the general rule allowing the liability of the manufacturer to be
determined by principles of general negligence regardless of notions of privity. See
Carter v. Yardley & Co., 319 Mass. 92, 64 N.E. 2d 693, 700 (1964); Baumgartner
v. National Cash Register Co., 146 M. 346, 406 P.2d 686 (1965).
'See James, Products Liability, 34 TEx. L. REV. 49, 68-73 (1955).
'Negligence in design is one aspect of manufacturer's negligence. James, Products
Liability, id., at 50, states that "The maker of an article for sale or use by others
must use reasonable care and skill in designing it and in providing specifications for
it so that it is reasonably safe for the purposes for which it is intended, and for
other uses which are foreseeably probable." See Garbutt v. Schechter, 167 Cal. App.
2d 396, 334 P.2d 225 (1959) (manufacturer negligent in designing chrome chair
which tipped when rather heavy woman sat in it).
VJames, supra note 3, at 66, states the following standard of care in manufacturing
the product: "The maker of an article for sale or use must be reasonably careful
to prevent dangerous conditions in it caused by a miscarriage in the manufacturing
process. This duty calls for reasonable skill and care in the process of manufacturing
and for reasonable inspection to discover defects." See Trowbridge v. Abrasive Co.
of Philadelphia, 190 F.2d 825 (3rd Cir. 1951) (manufacturer liable for failure to
utilize various tests in determining internal flaws).
'Professor James, supra note 3, at 55-56, states that the manufacturer is under a
duty to give "reasonable warning or instructions for safe use where the prudent
maker would foresee that a condition or propensity of the product is not likely to be
fully known and appreciated by those using it, and that some use to which the
article is likely to be put will be unreasonably dangerous." See Tomao v. A.P.
De Sanno & Sons, 209 1.2d 544 (3rd Cir. 1954) (manufacturer liable for failure to
warn that a grinding wheel will disintegrate at a speed faster than 6000 rpms).
7James,
supra note 3, at 49.
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In order to prove the necessary causal relation between the negligent creation of the defect and the injury, circumstantial evidence is
often employed.8 Sufficiently disproving the explanations of other possible causes of the injury, the consumer must establish that the injury
most probably resulted from the manufacturer's negligent act.9
Superseding intervening conduct of the consumer or of the intermediate vendees will relieve the manufacturer of liability.' 0
Although the consumer has the action in negligence at his disposal,
the protection extended to the consumer by this action is very inadequate.
He must show the negligent act of the manufacturer which is usually
impossible since the manufacturer has possession of all the factual evidence." The consumer is forced to rely upon the theory of res ipsa loquitur
whose great complexities and difficult application add an extra burden
to the consumer's already heavy burden. 1 2 In addition the manufacturer
is usually capable of proving that he utilized all reasonable precautions
3
and thereby precluding recovery by the consumer under negligence.
The consumer is forced to bear the total loss. Negligence provides a thin
4
shield of protection against the massive machinery of industry.
STRICT LIABILITY
Under this doctrine a manufacturer is strictly liable in tort when
he places a defective 15 product on the market which causes injury to the
ultimate consumer.' 6 A product is considered defective when it is un8Noel, Manufacturer's Negligence of Design or Directions for Use of a Product,
71 YALE L.J. 816, 993 (1962); Gillam, supra note 2, at 145.
9PRossER, TORTS 223 (3rd ed. 1964).
"OGillam, supra note 2, at 146, states that the manufacturer is liable for any foreseeable negligence on the part of an intermediate seller. Generally the manufacturer
is liable for the failure of a seller or handler in the distributive chain or the
consumer to inspect for possible defects or to protect against such. See Noel,
Products Liability of a Manufacturer in Tennessee, 22 TENN. L. REV. 985, 993
(1953); Ford Motor Co. v. Waggoner, 183 Tenn. 392, 192 S.W.2d 940 (1946)
(conscious awareness of the risk by the dealer in not installing hood latch that was
sent by the manufacturer and ordered installed relieved the manufacturer of liability); Tomicich v. Western-Knapp Engineering Co., 25 St. Rep. 695 (D. Mont. 1968)
(manufacturer of a conveyor belt not liable since the plaintiff-operator deliberately
exposed himself to an appreciated danger in removing mud from the sheaves).
"Gillam, supra note 2, at 146.
29PRossF,
TORTS 218 (3rd ed. 1964). Generally the plaintiff in utilizing res ipsa loquitur
has the difficult task of proving that the manufacturer has control of the factors
which produced the accident. See Noel, Products Liability in Tennessee, supra note
10, at 995. For an example of the difficulty of res ipsa see Jangula v. United
States Rubber Co., 147 M. 98, 410 P.2d 462 (1966).
1,Gillam,
supra note 2, at 146.
4
' Gillam, supra note 2, at 153, illustrates the deficiency of the negligence action by
enumerating 29 different ways that the courts have attempted to circumvent the
privity requirement in a warranty action under the Uniform Sales Act in order to
bring the action in contractual warranty rather than negligence.
"'A product is defective when, at the time it leaves the seller's hands, it is in a
condition not contemplated by the consumer and is unreasonably dangerous to him.
See the RESTATEMENT §402A comment g.
"RESTATEMENT §402A; Sweeney v. Mathews, 94 Ill. App.2d 6, 236 N.E.2d 439 (1968);
Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc., 27 Cal. Rptr. 697, 277 P.2d 897 (1963);
Dippel v. Sciano, 37 Wis.2d 543, 155 N.W.2d 55 (1967). Strict liability in tort
historically developed from an extension of the liability imposed in food products to
all other products. See Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc., supra, at 700;
Suvada v. White Motor Co., 210 N.E.2d 182 (Ill. 1965). The development is discussed in Prosser, The Assault Upon the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer),
69 YALE L. J. 1099, 1103 (1960).
https://scholarworks.umt.edu/mlr/vol31/iss1/3
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STRICT LIABILITY

reasonably dangerous to the user or to any of his property within the
zone of danger. 1'7
The standard to be applied to determine if the product is dangerous
is that of an ordinary consumer who purchases it with knowledge com5
mon to the community.'
A product may be rendered defective by the manufacturer's failure
to give adequate warning of its dangerous propensities. 19 A federal
court attempting to apply Montana law, but without any Montana precedent held a drug manufacturer strictly liable for failure to provide
warning that adults could contact polio from its vaccine that was ad20
ministered in a community clinic.
Where the only damage that the consumer has incurred is a loss of
the bargain or that the goods were sub-standard in quality, strict liability
is not generally applied.

21

The injured consumer must prove the necessary causal relation by
establishing that the injury resulted from the defective product and
22
that the product was defective when it left the manufacturer's control.
This is usually accomplished by the utilization of circumstantial evidence
to produce sufficient evidence that there was a greater probability that
the defect was in the product at the time it left the manufacturer's con23
trol and that the defect caused the injury.
Strict liabiility of the manufacturer, like negligence, can be relieved
by superceding intervening conduct on the part of the consumer or intermediate vendees. 24 If the intervening conduct consists merely in a failure
to discover the defect in the product or a failure to guard against the

7
1'
RESTATEMENT §402A comment d; Prosser, The Fall of the

Citadel (Strict Liability
to the Consumer), 50 MiNN. L REv. 791, 821-822 (1966). See Gherna v. Ford
Motor Co., 55 Cal. Rptr. 95, 246 Cal. App. 2d 639 (1966) (manufacturer strictly
liable for damage to a car which resulted from a fire caused by a defective wiring
system).
"RESTATEMENT §402A comment i.
"RESTATEMENT §402A comment j; Prosser, The Fall, supra note 17, at 811.
2Davis v. Wyeth Laboratories, 399 F.2d 121 (9th Cir. 1968).
nProsser favors denial of recovery under strict liability for such loss. Prosser, The
Fall, supra note 17, at 822. See Santor v. A. & M. Karagheusian, Inc., 44 N.J. 52,
207 A.2d 305 (1965) (allowing recovery for loss in value of a carpet due to defective
quality); Seely v. White Motor Co., 45 Cal. Rptr. 17, 403 P.2d 145 (1965) (Expressly disapproving of the Santor case, the court refused to apply strict liability where
a truck did not perform to the expectations of the purchaser.); State v. Campbell,
442 P.2d 215 (Ore. 1968) (refusal to apply strict liability where there was a loss of
profits due to defective seed).
'Sweeny v. Mathews, supra note 16, at 442.
'Prosser, The Fall, supra note 17, at 842-846.
"Prosser says that the rule applicable in negligence should be also applied in strict
liability. Prosser, The Fall, supra note 17, at 826.
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possibility of its existence, rather than a voluntary, conscious, unreasonable encountering of a known risk, the manufacturer will not be relieved
25
from liability.
There is a question as to whether or not a bystander within the
zone of danger, such as a pedestrian injured by a defective automobile
but who cannot be classified as a consumer, may recover under strict
liability. 26 Such liability has been applied and there appears no reason
2 7
for not allowing such application.
Strict liability substantially provides more effective protection for
the consumer than a negligence action. The burden of proving and
establishing the specific negligent act of the manufacturer is eliminated.
Strict liability greatly enhances the consumer's chances of obtaining
compensation for an injury sustained from the use of a product produced and distributed without proper regard for consumer safety.
RECOVERY

UNDER THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE

All remedies under the Uniform Commercial Code are limited to
buyers or third-party beneficiaries of buyers who obtain the goods as
buyers.

28

In

order for a consumer in this catergory to recover against

the manufacturer, he must show the existence of an express warranty,2

9

'O.S. Stapely Co. v. Miller, 103 Ariz. 556, 447 P.2d 248 (1968); Sweeny v. Mathews,

supra note 16; Barth v. B.F. Goodrich Tire Co., 71 Cal. Rptr. 306, 74 Cal. Rptr. 752
(1968). But see Vandermark v. Ford Motor Co., 37 Cal. Rptr. 896, 391 P.2d 168
(1964) (manufacturer held liable for failure or incorrect servicing of a new car by
the dealer).
'The Restatement expresses no opinion. RESTATEMENT §402A comment o.
',Mitchell v. Miller, 26 Conn. Supp. 142, 214 A.2d 694 (1965) (parked car with
defective transmission rolled over embankment striking bystander and killing him;
strict liability allowed).
2'UNIFORM COMMERCIAL

CODE

[hereinafter

cited UCC]

§2-102 states

that the

scope

of Article Two "applies to transactions in goods." Although the term "transactions in goods" is not defined, it presumably refers to the Code concept of a sale.
Sections 2-313 on express warranty and 2-315 on fitness for a particular purpose
are couched in terms of "seller"
and "buyer."
Section 2-314 on implied warranty
of merchantability states that such warranty "is implied in a contract for sale"
which is entered into by the merchant "seller."
All warranties are given as to the
quality and condition of goods. Section 2-106(1) defines a sale as "... the passing
of title from the seller to the buyer for a price.'' Section 2-103(1) (a) defines a
"buyer"

as "...a

person who

buys or contracts

to buy goods."

In

the

same

section, a "seller"
is defined as "' ... a person who sells or contract to sell goods.''
Section 2-318 states: "A seller's warranty. .. extends to any natural person who
is in the family or household of his buyer or who is a guest in his home . . ."
(emphasis provided). This language suggests that only a "buyer"
is entitled to
the protection of the warranty and that the warranty is only given by the immediate
seller. See Donovan, Recent Developments in Products Liability Litigation in New
England: The Emerging Confrontation Between the Expanding Law of Torts and
the Uniform Commercial Code, 18-19 MAINE L. REv. 181, 198 (1967).
'Under § 2-313 an express warranty is created by an "affirmation of fact or
promise" made by the "seller" to the "buyer" regarding the quality of the article
sold. There is no requirement of formal words such as "guarantee" or "warranty."
The buyer does not have to rely upon the affirmation, promise, or description if it
is "part of the basis of the bargain." See Klien v. Asgrow Seed Co., 54 Cal. Rptr.
609, 246 Cal. App.2d 498 (1966) (advertising held to constitute an express warranty
and actionable by the ultimate consumer).
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impiled warranty of merchantability, 30 or an implied warranty of fitness
for a particular purpose. 3 1 Such warranties are subject to disclaimer.3 2
Next he must establish the breach of such warranty and the resulting
3
damage. Finally, the consumer is required to give notice of the breach.'
Even though the consumer has established the necessary elements
for recovery under the Uniform Commercial Code, he may be barred from
recovery by lack of privity between him and the manufacturer.
Historically, privity was a necessary requirement for an action in
warranty. 34 The Code expresses no opinion as to the requirement of
privity between the manufacturer and the consumer. 35 The question is
left open to the underlying case law of the jurisdiction.' 6 The Montana
court has not yet been faced with the question of the requirement of
7
privity under the Uniform Commercial Code.3

3

Section 2-314(2) establishes six detailed standards for determination of merchantability. "Generally speaking, merchantability means that the goods must be (a) of
a quality comparable to that generally accepted in the market under the name or
description by which they are sold, and (b) reasonably fit for their 'general' or
'ordinary' purposes." Donovan, Recent Developments, supra note 28, at 203.
'In order to establish that there is an implied warranty of fitness for a particular
purpose, the purchaser must show that "the seller at the time of contracting has
reason to know the buyer's special purpose" and that the buyer "is relying on the
seller's skill or judgment" or "the circumstances are such that the seller has reason
to realize the purpose intended and the reliance exists." UCC § 2-315 comment 1.
"Section 2-316(1) provides that language or conduct tending to negate or limit an
express warranty "is inoperative to the extent that such construction is unreasonable." Also, the section provides that an implied warranty of merchantability can
be excluded if it contains the word "merchantability"
and if written it must be
conspicuous. Also, language such as "as is" or "with all faults" in spite of the
requirement that the term "merchantablity"
be used in order to exclude an implied
warranty of merchantability excludes all implied warranties. Section 2-316 also states
that there is not an implied warranty to defects which a reasonable examination
would have revealed when the consumer has examined the goods or refused to examine
them. But such disclaimers may be subject to § 2-302 and may be declared
''unconscionable'' and, therefore, unenforcible. See UCC § 2-302 comment 1.
'Section 2-607(3)(a) requires that the buyer give notice of a breach of warranty to
the seller within a reasonable time "or be barred from any remedy." This requirement of notice has been circumvented in some instances by extending the duration
of a reasonable time to whenever the consumer gives notice or by refusing to have
such a requirement where the plaintiff is one of the third-party beneficiaries under
§2-318. See Tomezuk v. Town of Cheshire, 26 Conn. Supp. 219, 217 A.2d 71
(1965); Donovan, Recent Developments, supra note 28, at 229.
'Gilliam, supra note 2, at 131, 148. See WILLISTON, SALES §§ 195-197; PROSSER, TORTS
§ 83 (2nd ed. 1955).
"UCC § 2-318 comment 3.
"Picker X-Ray Corp. v. General Motor Corp., 185 A.2d 919 (D.C. Mun. Ct. 1962);
Wilson v. American Chain & Cable Co., 216 F. Supp. 32 (E.D. Pa. 1963); Henry
v. John W. Eshleman & Sons, 209 A.2d 46 (R.I. 1965); Leach v. Wiles, 429 S.W.2d
823 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1968).
"'As expected, the Montana court has not yet been faced with the question of extending
privity under the UCC beyond the basic "seller''-" buyer" relationship. There has
been dicta to the effect that privity should not be a defense to a breach of warranty.
See Jangula v. United States Rubber Co., supra note 12, at 115. For an argument
based upon the UCC and the statutory duty previously imposed upon producers of
food (R.C.M. §74-321) suggesting that there is Montana precedent for the abrogation of privity see Pedersen, Products Liability and Privity, 27-28 MoNT. L. REv.
221, 230 (1967).
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CONCLUSION
Without entering into the debate as to whether strict liability in
tort and warranty recovery under the Uniform Commercial Code are one
and the same, 38 the consumer has three different theories upon which to
predicate manufacturer's liability. Strict liability in tort is the only
one which provides a modicum of consumer protection. It does not require the establishment of the specific act of negligence of the manufacturer that destroys most negligence actions. Nor is it entangled with
the problems of privity, notice, or disclaimer as is the Uniform Commercial Code. Strict liability has a broader coverage of protection. The
Uniform Commercial Code is limited to buyers and members of the buyer's
family or household and guests in the buyer's home whereas strict liability
extends to all users and consumers plus bystanders.
In terms of pure allocation of loss, the manufacturer who has great
financial resources can absorb the loss better than the individual consumer. The manufacturer is in a better position to distribute the loss
among the entire class of consumers by passing the cost of insurance on
to the consumer.
Nineteen
Three federal
Circuit Court
cedent stated

states have already adopted strict liability in this area.39
courts have accepted it in absence of state law. 40 The 9th
of Appeals applying Montana law but without any prethat the Montana court would probably:

...adopt the views set forth below [strict liability under Restate-

ment § 402A] on the manufacturer's duty to warn of dangers in
'nondefective' but potentially harmful products.'

It is urged that the Montana court join in this wave of decisions and
adopt the doctrine of strict liability in products liability and extend to
the consumer at least a modicum of protection for injuries sustained
from the use of today's manufactured products.
RON A. BENDER
38See Shanker, Strict Tort Theory of Products Liability and the Uniform Commercial
Code; A Commentary on Jurisprudential Eclipse, Pigeonholes and Communication
Barriers, 17 WEs. RES. L. REV. 5 (1965); Littlefield, Some Thoughts on Products
Liability Laws A Beply to Professor Shanker, 18 WES. RES. L. RV. 10 (1966).
3Clary v. Fifth Avenue Chrysler Center, Inc., 454 P.2d 244 (Alaska 1969); O.S.
Stapely Co. v. Miller, supra note 25; Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc.,
supra note 16; Rossignol v. Danbury School of Aeronautics, Inc., 154 Conn. 549, 227
A.2d 418 (1967); Royal v. Black & Decker Mfg. Co., 205 So.2d 307 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1967); Suvada v. White Motor Co., supra note 16; Dealers Transp. Co. v.
Battery Distrib. Co., 402 S.W. 2d 441 (Ky. Ct. App. 1966); McCormack v. Hankscraft Co., 278 Minn. 322, 154 N.W.2d 488 (1967); State Stove Mfg. Co. v. Hodges,
189 So.2d 113 (Miss. 1966); Santor v. A. & M. Karagheusian, Inc., supra note 21;
Goldberg v. Kollsman Instrument Corp., 12 N.Y.2d 431, 240 N.Y.S.2d 592, 191
N.E.2d 81 (1963); Shoshone Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Dolinski, 82 Nev. 439, 420
P.2d 855 (1966); Marathon Battery Co. v. Kilpatrick, 418 P.2d 900 (Okl. 1965);
Heaton v. Ford Motor Co., 248 Ore. 467, 435 P.2d 806 (1967); Webb v. Zern, 422
Pa. 424, 220 A.2d 853 (1966); Olney v. Beaman Bottling Co., 220 Tenn. 459, 418
S.W.2d 787 (1967); Dippel v. Sciano, supra note 16.
4"Schenfelc v. Norton, 391 F.2d 420 (10th Cir. 1968); Greeno v. Clark Equipment Co.,
237 F. Supp. 427 (N.D. Ind. 1965); Yarrow v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 263 F. Supp.
159 (D.S.D. 1967).
"1Davis v. Wyeth Laboratories, supra note 20 at 127.
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